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R. v. Smith and Judicially Reviewing 
the Scope of Criminal Law  
under the Charter 
Christopher Sherrin* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In R. v. Smith,1 the Supreme Court of Canada assessed the constitu-
tionality of criminal prohibitions against the possession of marijuana in 
light of regulations that carved out a medical exception exclusively for 
dried marijuana. The Court held that the exception was too narrow and 
declared the criminal prohibitions of no force and effect to the extent that 
they prohibit a person with a medical authorization from possessing 
marijuana derivatives for medical purposes.2  
Smith was the Court’s first real foray into the lengthy saga of medical 
marijuana Charter3 litigation4 and, at first glance, its decision appears to 
reflect a banal application of established law to a factual finding at trial. 
The Ontario Court of Appeal had decided 15 years earlier in R. v. Parker 
that it violated section 7 of the Charter to deprive an individual, by 
means of a criminal sanction, of access to marijuana reasonably required 
for the treatment of a serious medical condition.5 The Supreme Court 
simply applied that principle to the factual finding that, in some cases, 
                                                                                                                       
*  Faculty of Law, University of Western Ontario.  
1  [2015] S.C.J. No. 34, 2015 SCC 34 (S.C.C.), varg [2014] B.C.J. No. 2097 (B.C.C.A.) 
[hereinafter “Smith SCC”]. 
2  By marijuana derivatives, the Court was referring to products containing the active 
medicinal compounds extracted from the marijuana plant. 
3  Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being 
Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “Charter”]. 
4  Most of the history of the litigation is outlined in R. Solomon & M. Clarizio, “The Highs 
and Lows of Medical Marijuana Regulation in Canada” (2015) 62 Crim. L.Q. 536. The history also 
includes the latest decision from the Federal Court in Allard v. Canada, [2016] F.C.J. No. 195, 2016 
FC 236 (F.C.T.D.). Prior to Smith, the Supreme Court’s involvement was limited to denying leave to 
appeal in a couple of cases. 
5  R. v. Parker, [2000] O.J. No. 2787, 49 O.R. (3d) 481 (Ont. C.A.), varg [1997] O.J. No. 4923 
(Ont. Prov. Div.). 
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non-dried marijuana is reasonably required for the treatment of some 
medical conditions. 
Scratching below the surface, however, uncovers issues that call into 
question the legitimacy of the Court’s decision to override the 
government’s regulatory choice. The trial record in Smith was 
problematic: the evidence regarding the medical benefits of marijuana 
derivatives was of questionable reliability; it was sometimes unclear 
what evidence had been accepted by the trial judge; the value of some 
of the evidence was open to question; the significance of some of the 
findings at trial was debatable; some significant issues were largely 
ignored. These problems raised some important matters for the 
Supreme Court to discuss, but its judgment failed to address a 
surprising number of them. What is open to criticism in the Court’s 
judgment in Smith, therefore, is not so much the outcome or the 
discrete conclusions that led to it (although a couple of them were a 
little curious) as the extent to which the judgment overlooked issues 
and smoothed over problems in the record. 
In a constitutional democracy, judicial review of the acceptable 
scope of the criminal law is entirely appropriate. But its legitimacy 
depends critically on courts engaging in a careful, comprehensive, and 
rigorous review of the evidence tendered and arguments made in 
support of (and against) a constitutional claim. In a constitutional 
democracy, the members of the public deserve no less. Regretfully, and 
with great respect, it is not apparent that in Smith we quite got what we 
deserved. 
II. R. v. SMITH 
Owen Smith worked for the Cannabis Buyers Club of Canada. The 
Club sold marijuana and marijuana products to people who the Club 
deemed had a medical condition for which marijuana might provide 
relief.6 It sold not only dried marijuana for smoking, but edible and 
topical marijuana products — cookies, gel capsules, rubbing oil, topical 
patches, butters and lip balms. Smith’s job was to help produce those 
marijuana derivatives by extracting the active compounds from the 
marijuana plant.  
                                                                                                                       
6  For purposes of this article, I will eschew references to the scientific terminology used to 
refer to marijuana and its preparations and derivatives. Nothing turns on terminological precision so 
I will simply use the colloquial but familiar term “marijuana”. 
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In December 2009, the police found Smith in possession of dried 
marijuana as well as cookies, massage oils, and lip balms that contained 
tetrahydrocannabinol (“THC”), the main active compound in marijuana. 
He was charged with possession of marijuana and with possession of 
THC for the purpose of trafficking, contrary to sections 4 and 5 of the 
Controlled Drugs and Substances Act (“CDSA”).7 
Smith defended the charges on the basis that the offence provisions 
were unconstitutional, being in violation of section 7 of the Charter. His 
argument was that the CDSA did not provide an adequate exemption for 
possession of marijuana for medical purposes. At the relevant time, the 
Marihuana Medical Access Regulations (“MMARs”) promulgated under 
the CDSA8 only authorized medically approved individuals to possess 
dried marijuana. Smith argued that for the exemption to be constitutional 
it had to extend beyond dried marijuana to medically required marijuana 
derivatives. Smith did not use medical marijuana himself, and the  
club for which he worked did not have a production licence under the 
MMARs.9 
Smith’s argument succeeded at trial and on appeal. The trial judge 
declined to stay the proceedings after the Charter ruling but Smith was 
acquitted because the Crown elected to call no evidence. The Crown was 
not permitted to reopen its case following its unsuccessful appeals. 
The Supreme Court held that the criminal prohibition against 
possession of marijuana derivatives infringed the liberty and security of 
the person interests, protected by section 7 of the Charter, of both Smith 
and medical marijuana users. Most significantly, the Court held that the 
prohibition against possession of marijuana derivatives “for medical 
purposes limits liberty by foreclosing reasonable medical choices 
through the threat of criminal prosecution … . Similarly, by forcing a 
person to choose between a legal but inadequate treatment and an illegal 
but more effective choice, the law also infringes security of the 
person.”10 
That holding was key to the entire decision. The Crown argued that 
the evidence led at trial established only that some individuals preferred 
                                                                                                                       
7  S.C. 1996, c. 19. 
8  SOR/2001-227 [repealed by s. 267 of and replaced by SOR/2013-119]. 
9  Smith was held to have standing to make the argument on the basis that accused persons 
have standing to challenge the constitutionality of the law they are charged under, even if the alleged 
unconstitutional effects are not directed at them and even if the remedy for the constitutional 
deficiency will not necessarily end the charges against them: supra, note 1, at para. 12. 
10  Supra, note 1, at para. 18. 
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oral and topical marijuana treatments, not that the treatments had any 
therapeutic benefit. The Court responded as follows: 
… This submission runs counter to the findings of fact made by the trial 
judge. After a careful review of extensive expert and personal evidence, 
the trial judge concluded that in some circumstances the use of cannabis 
derivatives is more effective and less dangerous than smoking or 
otherwise inhaling dried marihuana. A trial judge’s conclusions on issues 
of fact cannot be set aside unless they are unsupported by the evidence or 
otherwise manifestly in error ... . The evidence amply supports the trial 
judge’s conclusions on the benefits of alternative forms of marihuana 
treatment; indeed, even the Health Canada materials filed by the Crown’s 
expert witness indicated that oral ingestion of cannabis may be 
appropriate or beneficial for certain conditions.  
… While it is not necessary to conclusively determine the threshold for 
the engagement of s. 7 in the medical context, we agree with the 
majority at the Court of Appeal that it is met by the facts of this case. 
The evidence demonstrated that the decision to use non-dried forms of 
marihuana for treatment of some serious health conditions is medically 
reasonable.11 
Once the Court accepted the medical benefits of marijuana 
derivatives, everything else quickly followed. The primary objective of 
the restriction to dried marijuana was deemed to be the protection of 
health and safety.12 Since using non-dried marijuana is, for some patients 
who qualify for legal access to medical marijuana, more effective and 
less dangerous as a treatment than inhaling dried marijuana, prohibiting 
non-dried marijuana undermines rather than protects the health and 
safety of medical marijuana users, rendering the prohibition arbitrary  
and contrary to the principles of fundamental justice.13 For the same 
                                                                                                                       
11  Id., at paras. 19-20. 
12  The Crown argued that, more specifically, the objective was the protection of health and 
safety by ensuring that drugs offered for therapeutic purposes comply with the safety, quality and 
efficacy requirements set out in the Food and Drugs Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. F-27. The Court replied, 
supra, note 1, at para. 24, that “[t]his qualification does not alter the object of the prohibition; it 
simply describes one of the means by which the government seeks to protect public health and 
safety. Moreover, the MMARs do not purport to subject dried marihuana to these safety, quality and 
efficacy requirements, belying the Crown’s assertion that this is the object of the prohibition.” The 
Crown argued that another objective of the regulatory restriction was to assist in combatting 
diversion of medical marijuana into the illegal market. The Court quickly dismissed that argument as 
unsupported by the evidence: supra, note 1, at para. 27. 
13  Relying on Canada (Attorney General) v. Bedford, [2013] S.C.J. No. 72, 2013 SCC 72 
(S.C.C.), varg [2012] O.J. No. 1296 (Ont. C.A.), the Court noted that a law is arbitrary if it imposes 
limits on liberty or security of the person that have no connection to its purpose. 
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reason, the regulatory restriction failed under section 1 of the Charter, 
there being no rational connection between the means and the objective. 
The Court declared the criminal prohibitions on possession of marijuana 
in sections 4 and 5 of the CDSA of no force and effect, to the extent that 
they prohibit a person with a medical authorization from possessing 
marijuana derivatives for medical purposes. 
III. THE TRIAL RECORD 
In order to properly understand the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Smith, it is necessary to understand the record on which the decision was 
based. For that, one must refer to the trial decision of Johnston J.14 
Justice Johnston made the following findings regarding the benefits of 
using marijuana derivatives rather than dried marijuana in the course of 
medical treatment: 
● For gastro-intestinal conditions such as Crohn’s disease or Irritable 
Bowel Syndrome, oral ingestion of the main active compounds of 
marijuana (THC and CBD)15 would “arguably” deliver the therapeutic 
benefit more directly to the site of pathology.16 
● Oral ingestion prolongs the effects of the drug in a person’s system 
and thus would be “better” for someone with a chronic condition of 
pain or glaucoma, as some level of therapeutic dosage would remain 
while the person slept.17 
● For someone who needs speedy assimilation of the active compounds, 
spraying a solution containing those compounds under the tongue 
can, like smoking dried marijuana, provide faster assimilation, but 
without the health risks associated with smoking.18 
Not a single scientific study is referenced in the trial judgment, or in 
the judgments on appeal, in support of these findings. Justice Johnston 
appeared to base his findings regarding the sometimes superior medical 
benefits of marijuana derivatives almost exclusively on the testimony  
 
                                                                                                                       
14  [2012] B.C.J. No. 730, 2012 BCSC 544 (B.C.S.C.), vard [2014] B.C.J. No. 2097 
(B.C.C.A.) [hereinafter “Smith Trial”]. 
15  THC, as noted above, is short for tetrahydrocannabinol. CBD is short for cannabidiol. 
16  Supra, note 14, at para. 45. 
17  Id., at para. 45. 
18  Id., at para. 45. 
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provided by the one expert witness called by the defence, Dr. David Pate.19 
At the same time, he also offered some rather negative assessments of  
Dr. Pate’s testimony: 
● While well-meaning and honest, Dr. Pate “strayed from objective 
opinion into advocacy, and … appeared at times argumentative when 
testifying”.20 
● A Crown expert’s criticism of Dr. Pate “for making assertions with 
little scientific support was well taken”.21 
● “Dr. Pate seemed a bit too willing to accept some benefits of 
cannabis products as possible, based on his common sense or 
extrapolation from other evidence”.22 
● “The way in which Dr. Pate gave some of his evidence suggested 
that he was both amused and frustrated by government attitudes 
toward cannabis marihuana and its components, given its 
pervasiveness in both the underground economy and its growing 
acceptance as medicine. This has lessened the weight I put on  
Dr. Pate’s evidence.”23 
In addition to the findings regarding the relative benefits of marijuana 
derivatives, the trial judge also found or accepted that: 
● Because of the slow build-up of the drug in the body with oral 
ingestion, dosages are more difficult to manage, as it takes some time 
to determine when the optimum therapeutic level has been reached.24 
● Oral ingestion has the “detriment of taking longer to build a 
therapeutic level of the drug than would occur with smoking dried 
marihuana”.25 
● Topical administration of the drug, by applying it directly to the site 
of skin infections, or to inflamed joints, is controversial.26 
                                                                                                                       
19  All of the findings reproduced above were listed in a single paragraph, introduced by the 
words: “From Dr. Pate’s evidence I accept”. 
20  Supra, note 14, at para. 38. The same criticism was levelled against one of the Crown’s 
expert witnesses. 
21  Id., at para. 39. A similar criticism was made against one of the Crown’s expert witnesses. 
22  Id., at para. 41. 
23  Id., at para. 43.  
24  Id., at para. 45. 
25  Id., at para. 45. 
26  Id., at para. 64. 
(2016) 76 S.C.L.R. (2d) SCOPE OF CRIMINAL LAW 297 
● Smoking would be a better way to take a therapeutic dose of 
marijuana in case of a sharp increase in pain or discomfort, although 
smoking marijuana poses added health risks associated with inhaling 
smoke.27 
● The precise basis for the therapeutic benefits of marijuana “is 
masked to some extent by the belief set or faith with which many 
medical users have approached their use, and has been made more 
difficult to … measure by the historical proscriptions against 
marihuana use”.28 
IV. A WEAK RECORD RAISING MANY QUESTIONS 
The trial record in Smith was not strong. The British Columbia Court 
of Appeal twice noted that, beyond question, the evidentiary record in the 
case was weaker than it was in the seminal case of Parker.29 The obvious 
question is whether the record was strong enough. Was the evidence at 
trial, and were the findings at trial, sufficient to establish a reasonable 
need for marijuana derivatives in the treatment of serious medical 
conditions? 
The technical answer, of course, is that they were because they were 
sufficient to establish, on a balance of probabilities, reasonable medical 
need in the eyes of the trier of fact. But should the trial record have been 
deemed sufficient, both by the trial judge and the judges on appeal? The 
record in support of the applicant’s position may actually have been 
stronger than is suggested by the trial judgment, but on its face the 
judgment causes concern for a number of reasons.  
There were obviously some credibility concerns with Dr. Pate’s 
testimony; they were for the trial judge to resolve. Of greater interest is 
the fact that there were also reliability concerns with Pate’s evidence.  
He made at least some assertions with little scientific support. He was 
too willing to accept as possible some benefits of cannabis products.  
He sometimes took on the role of an advocate. He did not appear to rely 
on scientific studies (at least to a degree significant enough to be worthy 
of mention). He was forced, at least sometimes, to fall back on common 
sense and extrapolation. Over and above all this, the trial judge noted that 
                                                                                                                       
27  Id., at para. 45. 
28  Id., at para. 46. 
29  R. v. Smith, [2014] B.C.J. No. 2097, 2014 BCCA 322, at paras. 94, 104 (B.C.C.A.),  
varg [2012] B.C.J. No. 730 (B.C.S.C.) [hereinafter “Smith CA”]. 
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any evidence about the medical benefits of marijuana suffers from the 
problem that the precise basis for those benefits is masked by faith and 
the historical proscriptions against the use of marijuana.  
The question naturally arises whether that was the sort of foundation 
on the basis of which courts should be drawing conclusions regarding 
medical facts that are mostly dispositive of a constitutional issue.30 The 
lack of reference to supporting scientific studies is of particular note. In 
the absence of research, one must typically rely, at least to some extent, 
on untested suppositions, inferences, and extrapolations. I do not suggest 
that sufficient proof can never be found in such reasoning, but its use 
must, at the very least, command careful scrutiny of the assertions 
advanced and the premises underlying them. 
The trial judgment contains a rudimentary description of the basic 
premises underlying Dr. Pate’s assertions but no dissection of the 
premises nor any analysis of their validity. The Supreme Court’s decision 
similarly contains no real discussion of the quantity and quality of the 
evidence led at trial. The Court mostly just asserted that “[t]he evidence 
amply supports the trial judge’s conclusions on the benefits of alternative 
forms of marihuana treatment.”31 That is a rather surprising statement.  
If the trial evidence in Smith was ample, one is left to wonder what sorts 
of evidentiary frailties the Supreme Court would be willing to tolerate, 
without discussion, when intruding on Parliament’s legislative authority 
in criminal law. 
The Supreme Court was comforted by Health Canada materials filed 
at trial by the Crown’s expert witness. In the words of the Court, “even 
the Health Canada materials … indicated that oral ingestion of cannabis 
may be appropriate or beneficial for certain conditions.”32 That is a rather 
limited assertion by Health Canada. The materials were not referenced in 
any relevant way in the trial judgment but the judgment of the Court of 
Appeal contains some added information. The materials refer to “some 
possible” improvement in asthma patients.33 To say that oral ingestion 
                                                                                                                       
30  The adequacy of the evidentiary record was raised by the Crown on appeal, although it 
focused more on the gaps in the evidentiary record rather than the reliability of the evidence that was 
introduced. See id., at paras. 34 and 66. See also the Supreme Court’s judgment, supra, note 1, at 
para. 19. 
31  Supra, note 1, at para. 19. 
32  Id., at para. 19. 
33  Smith CA, supra, note 29, at para. 112. The Court wrote that “it is early days in terms of 
conclusive clinical trials on the use of cannabis but the research that has been done is replete with 
references to the benefits of orally ingested cannabis.” The example in the main text, however, was 
the only one given. 
(2016) 76 S.C.L.R. (2d) SCOPE OF CRIMINAL LAW 299 
“may” be appropriate or produce “some possible” improvement seems to 
add very little to the evidence in support of the medical benefits of 
marijuana derivatives. It is curious that the Supreme Court thought to 
attach any real significance to the materials. 
The British Columbia Court of Appeal was clearly concerned about 
the evidentiary record. In defence of the trial judge’s conclusions, it 
elaborated at some length on the testimony given at trial. It paid 
particular attention to the four “patient witnesses” called by the defence 
who testified to their experiences administering marijuana orally and 
topically to treat the diseases from which they suffered. The Court 
explained that the witnesses found products made with marijuana more 
effective in treating certain of their symptoms and disorders than 
smoking dried marijuana.34 It noted that “[t]he relief they reported from 
cannabis products was significant and, in some cases, life changing.”35 
The Supreme Court similarly relied on the evidence of the patient 
witnesses in upholding the trial decision.36 
The appellate courts inferred that the trial judge accepted and relied 
on the evidence of the patient witnesses in determining the medical 
benefits of marijuana derivatives.37 That inference was technically 
available; the trial judge did hold that, by limiting the patient witnesses 
to using dried marijuana, the law interposed “the threat of criminal 
prosecution between them and the form of medication found effective to 
treat the symptoms of their very serious illnesses”.38 The inference, 
however, was far from inevitable. The quoted statement was the only one 
in the judgment suggesting that the trial judge accepted and relied on the 
testimony of the patient witnesses in finding medical benefit. It was 
included in the discussion of the law, roughly two-thirds of the way 
through the judgment and long after the trial judge outlined the evidence 
and described his findings regarding medical benefit. Indeed, when the 
patient witnesses were first mentioned, the trial judge wrote that they 
“testified as members of the Club who obtain products other than dried 
marihuana”39 (rather than as people who claimed to derive medical 
benefit from the products). The judge also seemed to accept that 
                                                                                                                       
34  Id., at para. 9. 
35  Id., at para. 11. 
36  See, e.g., supra, note 1, at paras. 19-20. 
37  Smith CA, supra, note 29, at para. 95; Smith SCC, supra, note 1, at paras. 19-20. 
38  Supra, note 14, at para. 89. I am assuming that the trial judge was referring to marijuana 
derivatives having been found effective by the patient witnesses themselves, and not just by 
someone like Dr. Pate. 
39  Id., at para. 75. 
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“[a]necdotal reports of the efficacy of cannabis products in the treatment 
or management of various diseases and conditions should be approached 
with some caution.”40 Even if, despite all that, one can still assume that 
the trial judge accepted and relied on the testimony of the patient 
witnesses, there was ambiguity as to exactly which parts of their 
testimony he accepted. The trial judge clearly did not accept all the parts, 
since the witnesses testified to benefits from topical administration of 
marijuana41 but the trial judge did not find any medical benefits from 
topical administration. The trial judgment contained no discussion, or 
even description, of the testimony given by the patient witnesses 
regarding the medical benefits of marijuana derivatives. The judge 
referred to “the form of medication found effective” to treat the 
symptoms of the witnesses’ illnesses, but he did not explain the ways in 
which, or the extent to which, it was found to be effective. Surely some 
of this was worthy of discussion on appeal before the testimony of the 
patient witnesses was used to justify the trial judge’s findings regarding 
medical benefit. Yet nowhere in the decision of the Supreme Court is 
there mention of any of it.  
Even assuming that the trial judge did accept and rely on the 
testimony of the patient witnesses, it is not obvious their evidence added 
much. Their evidence was anecdotal. It was not supported by any expert 
medical evidence confirming that edible or topical forms of marijuana 
were effective in treating their individual illnesses.42 All of the witnesses 
smoked marijuana in addition to using it topically and ingesting it 
orally,43 raising the concern that they may have mistakenly attributed 
benefits from one form of administration to another. And their testimony 
asserting medical benefits from topical administration clearly added 
nothing, since no such benefits were ultimately found at trial. At the very 
least, this necessitated that the witnesses’ evidence be dissected so as to 
assess its value absent that aspect of their testimony — assuming that 
was even possible. 
The Supreme Court addressed one of these concerns. It held that  
the absence of supporting medical evidence was not determinative.44 
                                                                                                                       
40  Id., at para. 62. It is not entirely clear whether, in this passage, the trial judge was simply 
summarizing the evidence given by one of the Crown’s witnesses or was referring to a portion of the 
witness’s evidence that he accepted. 
41  See Smith CA, supra, note 29, at paras. 104, 107 and 109. 
42  See id., at paras. 107-108. 
43  See id., at para. 108. 
44  Supra, note 1, at para. 20.  
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Given the debatable significance of the patient witnesses’ testimony,  
and the ambiguous manner in which the trial judge used it, that seems 
like an inadequate analysis of the value and reliability of their anecdotal 
evidence, and maybe of such evidence generally in Charter cases.45  
Even more curious is the fact that the Court seemed to hold that the 
evidence established a reasonable medical need for marijuana in topical 
form. The Court held that the evidence “did more than establish a 
subjective preference for oral or topical treatment forms”.46 It also struck 
down the criminal prohibitions on possession of marijuana to the extent 
that they prohibit authorized individuals from possessing all forms of 
marijuana derivatives for medical purposes, rather than just orally 
administered derivatives. All of this suggests some lack of rigour in 
scrutinizing the evidence allegedly justifying intrusion upon Parliament’s 
choice as to the scope of the criminal law. 
The Supreme Court cited the need to defer to a trial judge’s 
conclusions on issues of fact unless they are unsupported by the evidence 
or otherwise manifestly in error.47 Although it was not specifically 
mentioned, presumably the Court had in mind its pronouncement in 
Bedford extending that well-established principle to cover findings 
regarding social science evidence as well as adjudicative facts.48 
Presumably as well, the Court was extending the holding in Bedford to 
cover what can loosely be described as the “hard sciences”, like many of 
the medical sciences, in which hypotheses can often be tested and 
scientifically validated.49 It may be that the need for deference justifies 
the failure of the Supreme Court to analyze in greater depth the reliability 
and value of the evidence tendered to establish the medical benefits of 
marijuana derivatives. But, given the apparent frailties of the evidence 
and ambiguities as to which parts of it were accepted at trial, the laconic 
approach of the Court in Smith comes across as a rather vigorous 
                                                                                                                       
45  In R. v. Mernagh, [2013] O.J. No. 440, 2013 ONCA 67, at paras. 63-65 (Ont. C.A.), leave 
to appeal refused [2013] S.C.C.A. No. 136 (S.C.C.), the Ontario Court of Appeal offered some 
thoughts about the value of anecdotal evidence in medical marijuana cases. It would have been 
helpful to hear the Supreme Court’s thoughts on the issue. 
46  Supra, note 1, at para. 20 (emphasis added). 
47  Id., at para. 19. 
48  Bedford, supra, note 12, at paras. 48-56. Adjudicative facts are the facts of the case at bar. 
49  See R. v. Abbey, [2009] O.J. No. 3534, 2009 ONCA 624, 97 O.R. (3d) 330, at paras. 104-120 
(Ont. C.A.), leave to appeal refused [2010] S.C.C.A. No. 125 (S.C.C.), in which the Court discusses 
the different types of sciences and the different criteria relevant to assessing their reliability. 
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application of the principle of deference.50 As indicated by its extensive 
review of the trial evidence (more extensive than is contained in the trial 
judgment), the British Columbia Court of Appeal did not feel content to 
rest on the need for deference.51 The approach of the Supreme Court also 
seems inconsistent with the increasing trend to subject the reliability of 
expert scientific testimony to greater scrutiny.52 
Even if the Supreme Court was fully justified in deferring to the 
factual findings of the trial judge, additional issues arose in light of what 
was actually found. The trial judge found that, for gastro-intestinal 
conditions, oral ingestion of the main active compounds of marijuana 
would “arguably” deliver the therapeutic benefit more directly to the site 
of pathology.53 Surely that is not a finding of any constitutional 
significance. Surely Mr. Smith had to establish more than an arguable 
medical benefit. Yet the Supreme Court cited this finding as one that 
justified the ultimate conclusion that use of marijuana derivatives can be 
of medical benefit.54 It is very hard to characterize this as a cautious and 
careful approach to constitutional review. 
The trial judge also found, more definitively, that oral ingestion of 
marijuana compounds is better for a chronic condition of pain or 
glaucoma. That may well be a finding of constitutional significance. But 
the trial judge also found that dosages are more difficult to manage with 
oral ingestion and that oral ingestion has the “detriment” of taking longer 
to build a therapeutic level of the drug than would occur with smoking 
dried marijuana.55 In other words, the trial judge found both benefits and 
costs of oral ingestion. One can presumably infer that he also found that 
                                                                                                                       
50  The evidence in Bedford seemed materially stronger, including “personal evidence of the 
applicants, the evidence of affiants and experts, and documentary evidence in the form of studies, 
reports of expert panels and Parliamentary records”: supra, note 13, at para. 54. 
51  See, e.g., Smith CA, supra, note 29, at paras. 9, 11, 44-52, 94-95, 104-115. The appeal 
court’s decision post-dated the Supreme Court’s decision in Bedford. 
52  See, e.g., White Burgess Langille Inman v. Abbott and Haliburton Co., [2015] S.C.J.  
No. 23, 2015 SCC 23, at para. 1 (S.C.C.), affg [2013] N.S.J. No. 259 (N.S.C.A.): “Expert opinion 
evidence can be a key element in the search for truth, but it may also pose special dangers. To guard 
against them, the Court over the last 20 years or so has progressively tightened the rules of 
admissibility and enhanced the trial judge’s gatekeeping role.” 
53  Supra, note 14, at para. 45. 
54  The Court cited this finding near the start of its judgment when it summarized the 
findings of the trial judge (although it said the judge found that oral ingestion “may” aid gastro-
intestinal conditions): supra, note 1, at para. 7. As discussed immediately below, the Court also cited 
one other finding of medical benefit made by the trial judge. In the remainder of its decision, the 
Court did not distinguish between the two findings, always discussing them collectively in 
concluding that the evidence established medical benefit. 
55  Supra, note 14, at para. 45. 
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the benefits outweighed the costs, but that was a judgment call, not a 
pure factual finding.56 It seemed to invite at least some brief discussion 
of the competing considerations by the Supreme Court. Yet none was 
offered. 
Even if the findings at trial were sufficiently unambiguous as to 
establish some medical benefit of marijuana derivatives, an issue remained 
as to whether the findings, and the evidence led in support of them, 
established enough of a benefit. There is ambiguity in the trial record 
relating to the extent of the benefit derived from the use of marijuana 
derivatives. The trial judge found that, for gastro-intestinal conditions, oral 
ingestion would arguably deliver the therapeutic benefit “more directly to 
the site of pathology”.57 A more direct delivery is presumably a better 
delivery, but whether it is a significantly or marginally better delivery is 
not clear. The judge also found oral ingestion would be “better” for 
someone with a chronic condition of pain or glaucoma,58 but how much 
better was left unexplored. The patient witnesses may have described a 
substantial benefit from using marijuana derivatives,59 but the reported 
record is not entirely clear60 and, as stated above, it is not clear that the trial 
judge accepted all aspects of the patient witnesses’ testimony (regarding 
oral ingestion). The case seemed ripe for some analysis of the degree of 
benefit necessary to establish a constitutional claim. The Supreme Court, 
however, did not specifically mention this issue, stating simply that 
marijuana derivatives offer “more effective” treatment, to some undefined 
degree.61 Perhaps any amount of benefit is constitutionally sufficient; it 
seems like the compassionate position. But given the content of the lower 
court judgments, some discussion of the necessary degree of benefit 
seemed appropriate — at least to the extent of referring to a few more 
details in the evidentiary record. 
                                                                                                                       
56  There was no indication in the trial decision, or in the judgment of the Court of Appeal, 
that the judgment call was based on an opinion given by a witness. 
57  Supra, note 14, at para. 45. 
58  Id., at para. 45. 
59  The Court of Appeal wrote, for example, that “the relief they [the patient witnesses] 
reported from cannabis products was significant and, in some cases, life changing. In the words of 
one witness, being able to use different forms of cannabis to treat her symptoms helped her ‘get her 
life back’ from the debilitating effects of her illness”: supra, note 29, at para. 11. 
60  From the information in the Court of Appeal’s decision, it is not always easy to determine 
precisely what benefit the witnesses reported from administering marijuana orally and topically 
rather than by smoking. The matter is further complicated by the fact that, in the absence of any 
finding at trial of a medical benefit from topical use, any asserted benefit from such use would be 
irrelevant. 
61  Supra, note 1, at paras. 18 and 25. 
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Arguably, the Court indirectly addressed the sufficiency of the 
medical benefits from marijuana derivatives when it responded to the 
Crown’s assertion that the evidence established nothing more than a 
subjective preference by the patient witnesses for oral and topical 
treatment forms. The Court wrote that “[w]hile it is not necessary to 
conclusively determine the threshold for the engagement of s. 7 in the 
medical context, we agree … that it is met by the facts of this case. The 
evidence demonstrated that the decision to use non-dried forms of 
marihuana for treatment of some serious health conditions is medically 
reasonable.”62 That reflects some sort of consideration of the significance 
of the available evidence. Unfortunately, it is also basically a statement 
of a conclusion without any meaningful explanation of the reasons for it. 
Even if the trial record established constitutionally significant medical 
benefit from the use of marijuana derivatives, there still remained a 
number of questions that received very little attention in all of the 
judgments in Smith. They are questions that a responsible medical 
practitioner would consider before prescribing medication. Are there any 
possible side-effects? If so, what and potentially how serious are they? 
Do we know anything about the effects of long-term use of the 
medication? Do we know anything about the interaction of the 
medication with other medications or treatments? Is there any risk of 
adverse impact on medical conditions not to be treated by the medication 
(but from which a patient using the medication may suffer)? An 
individual only has a constitutional right to access medication reasonably 
required for the treatment of a serious medical condition.63 Surely those 
sorts of questions inform an analysis of whether medication is reasonably 
required. I do not suggest that a court must have definitive, or extensive, 
answers to those sorts of questions before finding reasonable medical 
need, but on the face of the written record in Smith the courts knew 
almost nothing about the answers, because no one seemed to be asking 
the questions. The only thing that was clearly known was that the 
psychoactive effects of marijuana are an unwanted side effect from a 
medical point of view.64 No indication was given whether oral ingestion 
removes this side-effect. 
                                                                                                                       
62  Id., at para. 20. 
63  This precise standard was not clearly articulated either in Parker or in the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Smith, but both judgments seem to apply that standard. See Parker, supra, note 5,  
at paras. 103-104; Smith SCC, supra, note 1, at paras. 18 and 20. 
64  Smith Trial, supra, note 14, at para. 45. 
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That so much was, on the basis of the record, unknown about the use 
of oral and topical marijuana products may have been partly behind the 
Crown’s argument before the Supreme Court that there are health risks 
associated with using such products, and thus that the restriction to dried 
marijuana was justified on the basis that it restricted access to drugs to 
only those shown by scientific study to be safe and therapeutically 
effective.65 The Court responded to that argument as follows: 
… The evidence accepted at trial did not establish a connection 
between the restriction and the promotion of health and safety. As we 
have already said, dried marihuana is not subject to the oversight of the 
Food and Drugs Act regime. It is therefore difficult to understand why 
allowing patients to transform dried marihuana into baking oil would 
put them at greater risk than permitting them to smoke or vaporize 
dried marihuana. Moreover, the Crown provided no evidence to suggest 
that it would.66 
This passage, like the Crown’s argument, is open to interpretation, but 
it is a little concerning if it shows that the Court was willing to assume 
there are no adverse consequences from oral and topical administration 
of marijuana in the absence of any evidence that there are. That does not 
exemplify a careful, rigorous approach to constitutional review. The 
burden was on Mr. Smith to show reasonable medical need for marijuana 
derivatives. Was the burden not also on him, therefore, to at least show 
that there was no real cause for concern about adverse effects (even if the 
Crown shared the obligation to address this issue)? The Supreme Court 
was correct that dried marijuana has not been subject to regulatory 
review for safety, but seems to ignore the fact that that is the result of a 
court decision — a decision that left it to the government to design 
appropriate (and constitutional) rules regulating access to marijuana.67 
The Court also seems to ignore the possibility that transforming dried 
marijuana into another product by mixing it with other components could 
alter its chemical properties in ways that may be adverse to health. 
V. CONCLUSION 
I do not know whether a proper medical case can be made out for oral 
and/or topical administration of marijuana derivatives. I cannot say 
                                                                                                                       
65  See supra, note 1, at paras. 24 and 26. 
66  Id., at para. 26. 
67  See Parker, supra, note 5, at paras. 202-203. 
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exactly what issues the members of the Supreme Court contemplated in 
coming to their decision in Smith. But I can say that, on the face of the 
written record, the Court neglected to address a number of what appeared 
to be live issues germane to the resolution of the constitutional issue. 
That is troubling from the perspective of democratically appropriate 
judicial review. 
Perhaps I expect too much. Maybe it was not necessary for the 
Supreme Court to address all of the issues identified in this article; 
admittedly, some of them are less problematic than others. But I cannot 
help but think it was necessary for the Court to address more of them 
than it did. 
It seems that the Crown evidence at trial did not assert any negative 
effects from using marijuana derivatives.68 It is also true that the trial judge 
found that adverse health effects can come from smoking marijuana.69  
But neither fact relieved Mr. Smith from the burden of demonstrating 
reasonable medical need for using marijuana derivatives (which could 
come with their own dangers and be less effective than smoking 
marijuana). Neither fact relieved the Court from the obligation to carefully 
and rigorously scrutinize the finding of medical need. 
R. v. Smith is just one case in a long and ever-expanding history of 
constitutional review of the acceptable scope of criminal law. Its influence 
in the long term may be negligible. But it was the first opportunity for our 
highest court to demonstrate its approach to constitutional review in the 
medical marijuana context. It is regretful that the judgment did not offer us 
a little more. 
                                                                                                                       
68  See Smith CA, supra, note 29, at paras. 111 and 130. 
69  Supra, note 14, at para. 45. 
